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I. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW " 
Appellant pleaded guilty to forcible sexual abuse of a young 
man named SteveTrotter Jr. on the basis of a plea bargain offered 
by the prosecutor. (Appendix 1 ) . Three counts were dismissed and 
Appellant would not be sentenced under the mandatory minimum pro-
visions which might apply in this case. Further, Appellant had 
read the statements ma.de by ti le purported victim,, a young boy who 
had been placed with him by a Social Service agency, and believed 
the boy would tell substantially the same lies If brought to the 
witness stand, Oi i 1:1: le • Dther hai id 1 le knew that his record was ab-
solutely clear, that he had a history of service to the community 
both professionally and as a social worker committed to helping or-
phan children and In fact because the pre-sentence Investigator be-
came aware of the unpure motives of the young accuser and his soc-
iopathic tendencies, the pre-sentence report practically recommend-
ed nothing more than an extended probation. This case before Judge 
Dean Conder is numbered CR85-623 and would not have come to the at-
tention of this Court except for the fact that prior to the impos-
ition of sentence in that case, Appellant was charged again under 
the mandatory minimum forcible sexual abuse statutes with respect 
to another young boy, Adam S. This case resulted in a trial before 
Honorable James Sawaya*In which Brian Mildenhall was found guilty of 
one of the two charges against him. As Bryan declared under oath 
at his trial "the charges that Adam has made against me are word 
*85-o68 consolidated herewith 
1. 
for word the very same ones that Steve Trotter made against me.T! 
(Transcript of trial at p. 230, lines 23-5). This case is numb-
ered CR85-968. As Bryan testified (Transcript at p. 228, line 13 
through p. 232, line 15) Appellant told this young boy whose mother 
had requested he care for him, his brother and sister while she left 
the state, and for whom he had served as a surrogate parent the 
previous two years without incident. Appellant told Adam S. of 
what Steve Trotter had accused him of. Several weeks later Adam S. 
accused Bryan of those same crimes. 
The trial of Appellant before Judge Sawaya was marred by 
false evidence presented in rebuttal to his alibi. Although Ap-
pellant had requested full discovery in this matter, the informat-
ion Appellant was not informed that the witnesses would be present-
ing the evidence that they did, which evidence proved false but 
weakened Appellant's alibi sufficiently to result in the jury find-
ing him guilty of one of the counts, despite the contradictory test-
imony of the victim himself. 
Further, economic motives for the victimTs mother to lie 
were presented (Transcript at p.241 lines 5 - 1 0 and p. 133> 
lines 13 - 20). 
Further, the mental condition of the purported victim1s 
mother, Gwen Rayer, was raised (Transcript at p. 162, line 5 and 
p. 163) it was important to show that irx addition to ths econom-
ic motives (Gwen Rayer had not p^id Appellant for taking care of 
her children wMl? she left the state and before returning to live 
in tne Salt ^JKZ nr;is.'ai. ~e. :^r; See Transcript it vv. 163-66 ) 
Judge Sawaya refused to allow the records from Granite Mental 
p 
Health showing the schizophrenic nature of Gwen Rayer (Transcript 
p. 305 - 309). 
Because it was necessary to have Bryan Mildenhall testify 
to how Adam S. learned of the sexual acts of which he had told 
his mother Bryan, Appellant, had perpetrated on him it was nece-
ssary to bring in the issue of the previous guilty plea. At first 
the purported victim denied he had heard about Steve Trotter and 
Bryan and sex, as follows: 
Q. (by Mr. Macri) Is it (previous testimony) dif-
ferent from what you said today, that you didnft know anything 
about Steve and Bryan and sex? 
A. (by Adam S.) Yeah. 
(Transcript at p. 128 , lines 4 - 6 e_t seq. ) 
Finally this Court should be aware that much of the first 
jury panel had to be excused because of their prejudice against 
Appellant because he had pleaded guilty in the first instance (see 
dismissal of jury panel lines 23 - 25, p. 30 through line 30, 
p. 32). It is inescapable fact that the circumstances of the 
charges left Bryan Mildenhall no opportunity for a fair trial. This 
set of conditions was exacerbated when on February 18, 1986 Ap-
pellant's attorney received a notarized letter which has been in-
cluded in the record which letter was signed by Steve Trotter Jr. 
and notarized in his handwriting wherein he declared ,?I heard 
from one of my friends that my ex foster dad Bryan Mildenhall was 
found guilty of a sex crime about Adam/ I feel very bad about 
this because I know he couldnTt do it. It did not happen with me 
the way I first said it did and I wanted to clear him of my charges. 
3. 
Bryan did not force me to do anything". (Appendix 2) 
Based on this unsolicited letter Appellant requested to with-
draw his guilty plea and moved to have the prejudicial references 
of the first guilty plea, which so drastically affected the jury 
and led to conviction of the one count despite overwhelming evi-
dence to the contrary3 be set aside. Both Judge Conder and Judge 
Sawaya denied Appellant the opportunity and thus he must turn to 
this Court for justice and mercy.. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
EITHER ONE OF THE CASES IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
AND AT BEST TWO ABUSES OF DISCRETION; TOGETHER 
THEY ARE A SYNERGY OF INJUSTICE 
Case 85-623y to which Defendant initially pleaded guilty3 
and for which he faced sentencing became subject of a Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea in a series of appearances geginning March 14, 
1986. This Motion was denied and Appellant appealed. The Code 
Section involved, 76-5-404 U.C.A. requires the act to be done "to 
arouse and gratify the sexual desires" and "without the consent 
of (the victim)". Initially Appellant believed the complaining 
victim who was blackmailing him5 would tell the same lies on the 
stand as he had told police. When the notarized confession from the 
boy was received (Appendix 2) he felt he must withdraw his plea. 
Judge Conder disagreed and sentenced him to serve time concurrent 
with the second case. 
After AppellantTs conviction in the first case but before 
his sentencing, he was again charged with a similar crime in 
85-0968. He was convicted by a jury. Again, before sentencing,, 
4. 
when he received the notarized confession (Appendix 2) he moved 
for a new trial since the plea in the first matter on which his 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was pending, so prejudiced the pro-
ceedings that a fair trial was not possible. This Motion for New 
Trial was denied and Appellant was sentenced to mandatory mini-
mum sentence of five years. The appeals in both cases have been 
consolidated herein. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANT TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA IN CASE 85-623-
Judge Conder had difficulty throughout the proceedings with 
the complex fact situation in this case. He was concerned with 
the alleged victim1s age (Transcript of 85-623 at p. 2, line 15, 
inter alia). The information in the case had been amended to place 
the alleged crime in June of 1982 (see Appendix 1). Further, Ap-
pellant presented a certified copy of birth of the alleged victim 
to the Court which the Court finally acknowledged (Ibid at p. 133 
lines 21 - 25 and p. 12 lines 18 - 22, also, p. 11 line 20 where 
the Court states "it has been so amended in the Information). 
The Court was "gravely concerned" (Ibid at p. 14, line 12) 
and stated"(. . . and then you say if I assume all of Mr. 
MlldenhallTs facts to be true, then it!s unjust for Mr. Mlldenhall 
to have entered a plea of guilty. . . ") (Ibid at p. 15, line 6 
- 1 8 ) . 
Part of the CourtTs confusion came from the Prosecutorfs 
insisting that the alleged victim was under the age of 14 (see, 
for example, Ibid at p. 13, lines 23 - 25). The boy had not even 
5. 
been introduced to Appellant before he was 14 years of age .(rbid. p.2, 2?-; 
The Court heard the notary's testimony which it acknowledged 
(Ibid at p. 14, see lines 2 - 6 and 21 - 25, inter alia) but for 
some reason has not been transcribed. Appellant will move to sup-
plement the record for the details of the notaryrs testimony but 
this Court can infer (because itTs true) from the dialogue cited, 
combined with Appellantrs identification of Steve TrotterTs hand-
writing (Ibid at p. 4, line 3 - 4 ) that the boy had issued the con-
fession and recant of his charges voluntarily. 
The problem why the Prosecutor didnTt want to have the case 
tried after the confession was that the alleged victim, who had 
been committed to a State Youth Facility for his criminal activity, 
was on the run and nowhere to be found (Ibid at p. 4, lines 4 -9) 
and they had no way to find him. Rather than give Appellant the 
benefit of the doubt, and put the sociopathic victim who admitted 
he lied, on the stand, the Prosecutor pressed for Appellant to be 
forced to abide by his guilty plea. 
This is despite the fact that the purported victim alleged 
that he had set the whole situation up for the blackmail of 
Appellant, which was a fact that, without the purported victim1s 
confession appearing in Appendix 2, Appellant would have been 
unable to prove. 
The decision to deny Appellant's Motion for Withdiswal of his 
Guilty Plea is unjust given Mr. Mildenhall's poignant explanation 
for his Guilty Plea (Ibid at p. 17, line 5 et^ seq. through p. 18, 
line 25). This is particularly true when the recantation of the 
alleged victim had been received and acknowledged and the Court's 
6. 
confusion on the issue. The Guilty Plea should have been with-
drawn and Mr. Mildenhall should have been allowed a trial. It 
would have been no more expensive and burdensome to the State 
than this Appeal or incarceration, and the general principle of law 
is that a Defendant must be given every benefit of doubt. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE PROOF OF A BIASED JURY, UNCONTROLLABLE 
BECAUSE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT REMEDIAL 
BY THE COURT. 
It is because the Guilty Plea in the first case when Defend-
ant was set up by another purported victim that second case was so 
colored by the first conviction that a fair trial was impossible. 
First, the Court should be aware that the jury was qualified as 
being amenable to the first degree felony as charged and the mini-
mum mandatory jail term (p. 19 and 20, Transcript of CR85-968). 
Consider also the CourtTs considerations in this case. 
Second, in order tofhave Mr. Mildenhall testify to how the 
alleged victim learned of the sex acts he was alleging, Mr. Mildenhall 
would have to take the stand. In order to have him take the stand 
it was necessary to qualify the jury on the issue of the previous 
conviction. (Ibid at p. 28, lines 15 e_t seq. ) 
At least six persons in the jury panel indicated the pre-
vious conviction would affect their feelings and seven members of 
the jury panel were thus excused (see p. 30 and p. 31) the jury 
panel was excused and a supplemental panel was called in on the next 
day (Ibid at p. 32, line 7). 
If Defendant is actually guilty of the first criminal charge 
(and it should be pointed out that he had made some unqualified in-
7. 
criminating statements to the police prior to consulting with an 
attorney, which incriminating statements still might not have 
merited a guilty plea had Appellant known the lies were going to 
be subsequently recanted by the first "victim"), then the fact 
of the conviction should properly have been before the jury if Mr. 
Mildenhall planned to take the stand. 
In this case, however, he had to take the stand to explain 
why "the charges (the secondAvictim) has made against me are word 
for word the very same ones that (the first victim) made against 
me." (Ibid at p. 230, lines 2 3 - 2 5 ) There was no other way that 
he could defend himself and the confession of the first victim 
had not yet been received. In fact, as this Court can see from 
the letter included as Appendix 2 herein, had it not been for the con-
viction in the second case, the boy who complained in the first 
case would never have written his notarized recantation. 
From the description of the pastoral relationship of 
Appellant to Adam S. for two years prior to the alleged sexual abuse, 
a jury could very easily have concluded that the victim was lying 
or sleeping and dreaming had it not been for the fact of the first 
conviction. Since Appellant had nver believed his actions would 
lead to a second set of charges and because he wished to avoid 
the appearance of evil, he made efforts to terminate the relation-
ship with the boy he had rescued from a psychologically ill mother 
aand a transient home situation along with his brother and sister. 
He told the boy on June 29th of 1986 what had happened with the 
first bov and told him,.he Mould be.unable to see bim^agais.. 
8. 
The boy continued to call Mr. Mildenhall and In fact testified on 
p. 88 of the Transcript after the first alleged incident that tTI 
have known him for two years and couldn't believe that he could have 
did that." (Ibid at line 1). 
The jury hung on the issue of whether or not sexual abuse 
occurred on the night of June 29, 1985. The reason they hung is 
because the boy contradicted his own statement and admitted that 
Bryan picked him up on the 30th at the boyTs own home (compare 
the "boy's testimony in the transcript p. ??8 with earlier contradictions) 
As will be discussed in the next argument we also believe 
that the jury accepted on face value the false statements of certain 
witnesses to justify itTs prejudiced view of the case because of the 
first conviction. On p. 408 of the Transcript the Court will note 
that Ann Pettus5 a University of Utah communications student, had 
done a jury study in this trial and we offered to show the effect 
the false testimony had on the jury as a result of her extensive 
jury study. This was denied. 
We believe the taint of the first conviction so colored the 
second case that a fair trial was impossible. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
REBUTTAL WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE STATE GROSSLY 
MISREPRESENTED THE TRUTH; THAT IS, LIED 
The airtight alibi defense of Appellant resulted from, the 
testimony of several persons in his CB Club with relationship to 
the events of July 65 1986, the night the lights went out in Utah. 
This Court will recall that the jury was hung on the alle-
gations of June 293 1985 for the reason that the boy contradicted 
9. 
himself severely, photographs and other confirmatory data in-
dicated that the boy was mistaken, if not perjuring himself, and 
still three of the eight jurors found him guilty (ibid p. 403 -
404). 
The issue of the time during the night of the blackout became 
crucial and the jury believed the prosecutorTs position despite the fact 
that the witnesses for the prosecution did not tell the truth as 
will be demonstrated below. 
As Appendix 3> Defendant presents his Motion for Discovery; 
as Appendix 4 his Notice of Alibi Defense and as Appendix 5 the 
Prosecutorfs response on discovery. The Court will note that the Pro-
secutor on p. 410 of the Transcript, lines 5 - 1 2 suggests that 
it was not necessary to inform Appendant that these witnesses, 
who testified falsely, would be called. 
That the time sequence is important is clear. That the 
statements made by the rebuttal witnesses were false is equally clear. 
The crucial testimony regarding time appears on p. 333 of the Trans-
cript where Officer James Burns called as the witness at the in-
stance of the State and duly sworn testified as a police officer 
for Salt Lake City that he was requested to contact the alibi wit-
nesses. On p. 332 at line 22 and thereafter Officer Burns test-
ifies to the times relevant to the alibi. He testifies in line 21 -
23 on p. 33 that he checked police records and concludes the alibi 
was untrue. 
Appendix SB^ated March 10, 1986 is a statement from the dir-
ector of records who declared that the times mentioned in the police 
report of the burglar alarm failure are inaccurate and do not reflect 
10. 
the actual time of the incident. This document was secured long 
after the trial was concluded in order to demonstrate the inacc-
uracy of the officer?s unexpected testimony. The officer admits 
on p. 3363 line 9 and 10 that "I took most of my information from 
the actual police report." Because the electricity went out that 
night, all the computers were off and the 0000 readingsiwhich both 
Officer Burns on p. 337 of the Transcript lines 1, 2 and 3 and Of-
ficer Pat Smithfs testimony p. 325 at line 22 - 23 were inaccurate. 
The 0000 readings on which the jury depended, according to the jury 
study which was not admitted were not the result of accurate 
timeing but in fact the result of a computer malfunction. If 
Judge Sawaya had permitted the jury study information to be admitted 
this Court could see that Bryan Mildenhall!s alibi would have been 
confirmed, and the false rebuttal testimony is what the jury actually 
curt 
b e l i e v e d . (See a l so Appendix 5 CA showing a c t u a l reports) 
One could excuse Officer Smithrs testimony an error had it 
not been for the fact that on p. 3273 line 16, in response to the quest-
question "are you certain whether or not it might mean that the 
electricity was not operating on the clock that was recording this?" 
She replied "yes, I am certain." Further, to support her false 
statement, she continues on line 17 in answer to the question "so 
what you are suggesting is from this report that both the com-
plaint, the assign*ment and arrival were absolutely simultaneous?" 
"yes, thatTs not unusual." When pressed she indicated that she 
frequently saw 0000. 
Similarly false testimony was elicited from Kelly Astill as 
11. 
a rebuttal witnessfor the State. Mr. Astill was in charge of the 
Utah Power and Light records for the area where the alibi witnesses 
and Mr. Mlldenhall were at the time of the alleged offense of which 
Mr. Mlldenhall was found guilty. He brought the records to Court 
with him and this is recounted on p. 3^3 of the Transcript. Mr. 
Astill testified that the power in the area went on at 10:5^ P.M. 
in the evening. (Ibid at p. 3^4, line 15 - 16). 
Despite the fact that this unexpected witness testified to 
these facts to the jury and stated so unequivocally Appendix 6 A, 
B, and C indicate that this time was false. The Court will see 
in Appendix 6A that I inquired from Utah Power and Light whether a 
statement such as Mr. AstillTs could be made without reservation. 
Appendix 6B demonstrates his answer that it could not be so made. 
Appendix 6C is a confirmatory letter of the next door neighbor to 
the building housing the CB Club which confirms the trufchfullness of 
the alibi witnesses1 version of the time which , if believed, would 
have confirmed AppellantTs version of the facts which were truth-
ful, and which, had the trial not been tainted by the previous convictior 
and had Appellant been given the right to full discovery of the wit-
nesses against him, would have led to his acquittal. 
This is the measure of whether or not a new trial should be 
granted; that is, whether a new trial would have a substantial like-
lihood of resul-ting in a different result. Judge 3awayaTs denial 
of the new trial under the circumstances, when he had this inform-
ation available to him, was an abuse of discretion on his part and 
AppellantTs Motion for New Trial in this matter should be granted. 
In view of the mistatements of Salt Lake County Prosecution's wit-
12. 
nesses, it is practically obligatory. Although the decision is 
discretionary with that court, State v. Conrad 540 p. 2nd 1264; 
State v. Harris 513 P.2nd 438, still where the newly discovered 
evidence contradicting unexpected rebuttal testimony is probably 
seen to render different results probable on retrial of case a 
decision denying a new trial may be an abuse of discretion (State 
v. Harris op cit). As a general rule, suppression by prosecution 
of material evidence favorable to criminal defendant violates due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment irrespective of good 
faith of prosecution and, at minimum, requires granting of new trial. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
GWEN RAYER, MOTHER OF THE PURPORTED VICTIM HAD 
A SECRET MOTIVE FOR PROSECUTING APPELLANT AND 
A PREDIS-POSITION, WHICH APPELLANT WAS PREVENTED 
FROM DEMONSTRATING TO THE JURY, TO DO SO. 
Gwen Rayer was a hostile witness, not, Appellant submits, 
because he had molested her son. Actually, it was because he would 
not give her money she would not pay him money that he requested, 
and for which he was suing (Small Claims suit 85SC 7265 Salt Lake 
City Department, and Circuit Court, State of Utah). Mr. Vuyk the 
Prosecutor acknowledges that the Small Claims Complaint against Ms. 
Rayer couldpot be served because his address was concealed (lined 
12 - 153 p. 172). Ms. Rayer admits on p. 151 at line 24 - 25 that 
she owed Bryan Mildenhall money for taking care of her children 
while she was in Florida on a futile financial excapade. She re-
peatedly admits she did not pay him. 
She admits on p. 161 of the transcripts, lines 2 - 1 2 that 
she mispoke, at least, herself, at the preliminary hearing on the 
issue of whether or not any of Adam's several stepfathers had pulled 
13. 
down his pants. She admitted at the trial that they had. This is 
despite the fact Adam himself regularly denied this fact. Further, 
when Rayer GU p. 162 at line 15 admits she has had some psychol-
ogical problems in the past. On p. 163 at line 22 she admits that 
her five years of psychological counseling terminated just a month 
or so before his trial. Further, she admi^t/ on p. 164 that she, 
her husband and the three children were staying at the Salt Lake 
Transient Shelter less than a block from the location of the CB 
Club. She also admits that it was her idea that Bryan take care 
of her children. It should also be pointed out that on p. 169 of 
the transcript, lines 5 - 17s Ms. Rayer admitted that her young son 
had been having some serious drug problem and that she enlisted 
AppellantTs help, since he was a nurse to help him with those prob-
lems . 
Given his series of revelations from the testimony of Ms. 
Rayer, Appellant maintains that the CourtTs characterization of the 
financial issues as totally imaterial on p. 170 of the Transcripts, 
line 1 - 9 were prejudicial to Appellant, and took away another 
positive element for the presumed innocent Defendant. 
This Court should also be aware finally, that despite the 
fact Detective Pat Smith is quoted on p. 199 of the transcript at 
lines 22 - 25 that nAdam S. said he was afraid to say no to Bryan 
because his friend Graham Cunningham and Kim Peterson had been 
murdered by Mr. Bishop. He was afraid he might get killed if he 
may say no", in fact the boyfs testimony as above recounted was 
that he in fact did not believe that Appellant would do such sex-
ual things to him and he in fact solicited AppellantTs company aft-
er the first offense which he alleged (and subsequently he denied 
uniT oath) and recounted earlier and on which the jury hung. Had 
Appellant been able to present the issues of Ms. Rayer?s financial 
motives without the unfair characterization of the Court as above 
recounted, or had Appellant been able to follow through on the in-
formation regarding Ms. RayerTs psychiatric institutionalization 
(see, for example, transcript at p. 246, lines 4 - 1 0 and also the 
arguments advanced by Appellant on p. 305 - 309). Appellant 
may have even had a chance to overcome the prejudices of the jury 
caused by his unfortunate, though well reasoned, Alford - type 
guilty plea. Despite the citations by the State to keep the mental 
health records out of the Hearings, it is the position of Appellant 
that the mental health records can be introduced for impeachment 
purposes given the fact that Ms. Rayer gave self serving testimony 
regarding her mental health. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
HAD THE JURY NOT BEEN PREJUDICED AND A PAIR TRIAL 
FOR APPELLANT POSSIBLE IN THE SECOND CASE THE PER-
FECTLY CORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT, PATRICIA 
ASHFORD, SHIRIS ROSEBERY, ROBERT ASHFORD, DORIS 
HODGEMAN, DIXlfGRONAMAN, ANNA LEE WHITEHOUSE AND 
ARLENE GALLEGOS CREATED SUFFICIENT DOUBT TO HAVE 
RESULTED IN AN ACQUITTAL AND THUS A NEW TRIAL WAS 
APPROPRIATE. 
Appellant had no sexual activity with Adam S. (See for ex-
ample Transcript at p. 245, lines 19 - 25). This consistently runs 
throughout his testimony. Shirly Roseberry and her daughter 
Patricia Ashford, members of Appellant's CB Club, both testified 
that on the night when Appellant was allegedly molesting Adam S., 
he was actually at their home operating emergency procedures be-
cause of the power blackout and that he had returned Adam S. to 
his (AdamTs own home which was in fact the home of his aunt and uncle). 
(See eg. transcript at p. 268, line 5 through p. 272, line 4) and 
subsequent crossexamination; (see also, transcript at p. 286, line 
1 C 
1 through p. 293, line 7, as well as the testimony of Dective 
A 
Jim Burns regarding his conversations with the alibi witnesses in 
pages 330 through 34l of the transcript). Given this testimony 
the sexual activities described by Adam S. were physically impos-
sible and only the prejudice of the jury combined with the false 
statements of Detective Pat Smith, Officer Jim Burns, and records 
keeper Kelly Astill could have resulted in the Guilty Verdict. 
With respect to the allegations of sexual activity on June 
29, 1985 which were also made by the boy and on which the jury 
could not find Appellant guilty, again the record is clear that on 
that date Bryan was active in a CB Club meeting, the minutes of 
which were produced and the testimony of Doris Hodgeman, Dixi^ 
Gron&man, Anna Lee Whltehouse and Arlene Gallegos all confirmed the 
story which Adam S. finally told, recanting his previous testimony, 
that Bryan Mildenhall was not with him on June 20th and he saw 
him only briefly June 30th for a birthday party at BryanTs motherTs 
home (see for example, transcript at p. 281, line 4 et_ seq to 283, 
line 2; also, p. 259 lines 9 - p. 26l, line 24; p. 297, line 10 
through p. 298, line 16). 
ARGUMENT 
Bryan Mildenhall, while not perfect, is not guilty of two 
felonies. Though he pleaded guilty in Judge ConderTs Court, it was 
because he knew that his initial emotionally disturbed young ac-
cuser was going to lie and because he felt guilty that he had 
been induced to behave in an ungentlemanly manner with respect to 
his accuser. 
The accuser, upon learning that a second accuser had fabri-
cated accusations based on the first conviction, which fabrications 
were believed because of the initial set-up by him, recanted his 
accusations. At this point several months of hearings were held 
during which Appellant tried to locate the boy and failing that, 
as the State failed that also, Appellant brought the notary who 
had taken the boyTs statement, into Court. Despite the CourtTs 
confusion over the boyTs age (which confusion was finally resolved, 
as shown above) the Court held that the Guilty Plea should stand. 
Appellant suggests as he has throughout the criminal procedure that 
had he known that this sociopathic boy could ever have been made 
to tell the truth, he would not have pleaded guilty. When the boy 
did tell the truth he rightfully expected to receive the benefit 
of this truth. This benefit was denied him, contrary to elementary 
standards of criminal due process. 
With respect to the second case, the suppression of facts 
and the secretion of witness capable of establishing the innocence 
of the accused is highly reprehensible. In practice, and this is 
in many areas of American life*greater stress is placed on the imp-
ortance of winning than on using the correct and legitimate means 
for doing so. In the second case Defendant was seriously handi-
capped by the first conviction which he could not withdraw, despite 
the recantation of his serious charges. In the second case, as 
Appellant has pointed out, the accuser, with whom he is terminat-
ing his foster son relationship because of the previous conviction, 
he used exactly the same words against him, despite the fact that 
eveidence was overwhelming that the boy was fabricating the story. 
The jury understood this with respect to one of the two counts in 
the second Information but because of the lies told by reputable 
witnesses brought in rebuttal by the Prosecution, they convicted him. 
Appellant maintains that this was because of the lies and the 
spurious first conviction which should have been tried. 
IT, 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court Order both 
matters remanded for new trial. This is not only fair to Defendant, 
giving him the benefit of the doubt as required in criminal prosecu-
tions, Appellant also believes that the State will save money, as 
follows: At least $20,000 a year would be spent for the five years 
of the mandatory minimum prison term in this case. With the recanta 
tion of the first alleged victim, it is clear that a successful pro-
secution could not be brought against Appellant. In the absence of 
a prior conviction, and in light of truthful rather than falsified, 
testimony relating to Appellant's alibi, Appellant believes he would 
be acquitted of this second charge. Since Appellant's contention 
is supported by the record, this Court would fulfill both require-
ments of justice and mercy, when the issues on Defendant's life is 
so monumental, to grant the remands and have both matters retried. 
Dated this 10th day of December, 1986. 
s 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify I delivered two—(-£-)"* c o p i e s of foregoing 
Appellant's brief to David Wilkinson's office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 11th day of December, 
1986. 
Robert Macri, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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(Mice of % 
TED CANNON fgj 
County Attorney 
May 22, 1985 
Robert Maori, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
354 East 600 East 
SLC, UT 84111 
Dear Mr. Maori: 
Re: State v. MENDENHALL, Brian 
Circuit Court No. 8SFS0870 
In assessing the above matter we would offer the following terms 
in settlement: 
Plead to: COUNT I: 3° ( , . ,
 x i ) 
Other terms: 
The State will then move to: 
Amend count(s): 
Dismiss count(s): II through V 
Dismiss case(s) number(s) 
Date of Count I amended to JUNE 1982. 
Other: State will submit sentencing on presentence report 
The above offer is conditional upon it being accepted on or before 
Pre-Trial Conference, and further that the defendant commit no crimes 
between the time of this offer and sentencing. 
Very truly yours, 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
D Investigative Agency 
Don Harman 
Special Agent in Charge 
4th Floor 
G Administration 
Roger Livingston 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
4th Floor 
I Recovery Division 
Donald Sawaya Chief n»r»n 
4th Floor 
Q Justice Division 
John T Nielsen Chief Deputy 
D Civil Division 
William R Hyde Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
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Appendix 3 
Hob^it ' a c r i , Esc* 20tn 
35** East 600 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
r-i. j'U-soic 
15 THE T1H TO JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
nm nr* \ •» rr, r + « • 
... MOTION ^OP DISCOVERY 
:
 Circuit Co'irt .^o. 85 *S 16U9 
_ , . , , . - T ^ - - . ^ * D i s t r i c t Court So: gf/£g 
'^ -%f*<»r •* t^n**" 
To the County Attorney: 
Please disclose and nresent all material, reports, presentations 
and any docurents or other relevant materials vith regards to the prosecution 
of the above entitled case to Defense attorney Robert Macri. please include all 
documents relating ho rieetings of Adar Salisbury vith vour vitaes3 counseling unit. 
Tated this ^th September, 1985* 
* T^^JLL^isr /fl/ic<t i 
Certificate of Delivery 
I delivered a copy of the foregoing; to Tom Vuyk, County Attorneyfs Office, this 
6th September, IQ85. ^ - s 
A-DDendix k 
Robert ,racri, Zsq. 20^3 
35U East ^00 South 
Salt Lake ^ity, Utah 8U111 
Tel. 36U-3018 
IN THE $HIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
STAT? OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs, 
NOTICE OF ALIBI DEFENSE 
Circuit Court No. 85 FS 16U9 
District Court No: QcOL Q 
BRIAN XILDFIIHALL,
 ( * > IV O 
Defendant 
Comes now Defendant Brian Mildenhall through his attorney Rohert *'Tacri 
to declare that with respect to the actually charged dates of the offenses 
in the nresent action, as amended, i.e. June 29 3.nd July 6, 1985, Defendant 
intends to nresent testimony of the records' keeper at the Pioneer Valley Hospital 
where he worked and intends to work, 3^60 S. Pioneer Park Way West Vallev City 
about being on call the weekends involved, as well as his own testimony as well 
as the testimony of Shirley Poseberrv and Pat Ashford, residents of o3^ Soutn 300 
West, Palt r.ake city about the night of the blackout in Salt 'Lake City and the fact 
that 3rian "ildenhall was manning the CB emergency channel with then that note in 
their hore; furthur, that he attended a CB club meeting on the night of June ?Q 
with then at their home 
Tated t-'i 3 6th Jentember, I985 • 
'
 /JJL6.L<L^/^CI4 
Certificate of Delivery 
I delivered a ccoy of the foregoing to Tom Vuyk, 2o. Attorney1s Office, this 6th 
Sertemb°r l°?q, 
/ 
r^LLzq ^ t - i 
Appendix 5 
QMffce of % JSalt JIake fflount^ JVtinrit^ 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
September 11, 1985 
Robert Macri 
Attorney for Defendant 
354 East 600 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: BRIAN MILDENHALL 
Case No, CR85-0968 
Dear Bob, 
Enclosed you will find copies of the police reports, 
witness list, etc., that you requested. The records from 
visits with our victim counseling unit are work product of 
that unit and are not provided with discovery. If you need 
any additional information, please advise me. 
HEIDI BUCHI 
Secretary 
hab/001-04 
enclosures 
pc: file 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
nstration 
A Livingston 
Deputy County Attorney 
imtnKitrativp Affairs 
O County Attorney Victim Services 
Julie Branch 
Director 
4th Floor 
jB Justice Division 
Walter R Ellett 
Chief Deputy 
3rd Floor 
• Investigative Agency 
Don Harman 
Special Agent in Charge 
4th Floor 
D Civil Division 
William R Hyde 
Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
O Governmental Services 
Donald Sawaya 
Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
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^ ^ j^ j^trxwtwuuKjHwi^  i E L ' "BUD" W! LL0UGHBY 
M ~ _ l ^ . ^ ^ . . X ^ * . ^ a CHIEF OF POLICE 
450 SOUTH THIRD EAST 
TELEPHONE 535-7222 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
March 10, 1986 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This is to certify that the attached Case Number (s) 85-62066 Please note 
-^ that the times listed on the top of the report are inaccurate and do not reflect 
the actual times of the incident. Computer crash, 
is/are a full, true and correct copy or the original in my custody. This 
is in compliance with Rule 44, State of Utah, Proof of Official Record, 
Section (a) Authentication of Copy and Section (b) Certified Copy of 
Record read in Evidence. 
This letter is signed and notarized to be a true and certified copy by 
one of the Command or Management level personnel of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department Records Unit. 
&Ap&mll3iii 
Director of Records 
or 
or 
Lieutenant of Records 
Captain of Records 
SUBSCRIBgi--MD SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS /(Qlrl¥ DAY OF /J^Qy^ . . 1986. 
Hotiry P^a*r~ 
My Commission expires ^ / / / , 19 
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.*u SUCH AuCRESS: CMTS: 
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rorw. CASE PRINTOUT 
!P1 SAU LAKE CITY PMICf DFPT CASF183062066 
INCJ0507 0 7 / 0 6 / 8 ^ TIH 01 n WOO TIH AS!00100 |'IH ARVJOOJOO flM a ? 0 6 M l 
ABDR: 300 y 600 s ST CITYISI. APT: KAT:235 
TYPE52298 BURG ALARH CHP P O M CHP IDJ83F DSP P»: DSP 10: PRI IDJF64 
RP:HURPHY>BETTY ABDR: RES PH;S»5 SBAI 
BUS PH: HOW RCVO:T uuirsu DPF:P PRIJ3 SIJPJX SIR SEQ: 
LOCN'. 30OW 600S PREH Ml 6RIMHA15M JRS1CKJSI.P PRIOR ACT, 
iu: 418 00:00 BUI: «J2; m i B W : 
CHTS: 
IMR HU-REP0RT 
VERIFIED NCIC:2298 59907 JFALSEALARK WITH LICENSE 
DISPOSITN: UNABLE TO LOCAFF: 
NO SUCH ADltRESS: 
a m . CANCELLED: 
NO ACTION TAKEN! 
CITATION ISSUED: 
OTHER {EXPLAIN): 
CHTS: 
CHTS: 
CHTS: 
CHTS: 
CHTS: 
cms: 
CASE 85062066 
'.CAUSF UNKNOWN 
III 
nn END OF CASF nn 
Aupendix 6 A 
Boberi N. Macri 
Attorney at Lav 
354 Cut 6CO South • 6alt Lake Gty, Ulan 54111 
Tdromaw (SOI) 364-3018 
February 2U, 1986 
l!r. West Holmes 
Utah ?owr and Light 
1^07 West ^orth Tezrcle 
Salt Lake City, Utah SUllS 
Dear Mr. Holmes: 
On the blackout date of July 6th and Tth power went cut at a house 
located at 63k South West Temple in Salt Lake City. 
The power resumption time is crucially important in a criminal case 
that is ongoing and I understand that you have been informed that this is the 
case. 
I am told that the power went back on finally at 12:37 A.M. July 7th 
and I need confirmation of this at your earliest convenience in order that 
this criminal matter which is before the District Court may be resolved. 
If there are any questions, please contact me as above, 
Respectfully, 
cc/file 
client 
AFPEHDIX 6B UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
1407 WEST NORTH TEMPLE STREET 
P. O. BOX 899 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84110 
WES HOLMES 
CLAIMS ADJU8TKB 
soi-535-4027 M a r c h 1 2 , 19 86 
Robert N. Macri 
Attorney at Law 
354 East 600 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: July 6, 198 6, Power Outage 
Dear Mr. Macri: 
The power at 634 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
is supplied by Utah Power's Snarr Court No. 12 Circuit. To 
the best of our knowledge, power was restored to that 
circuit at 10:54 p.m. on July 6, 1985. This time, however, 
applies only to the Snarr Court No. 12 Circuit in general 
and not to any specific customers served by said circuit. 
In an emergency situation such as this, primary emphasis is 
placed on restoring power to the affected circuits and it is 
possible that the power at a specific location was not 
restored at exactly the same time as it was to the circuit. 
Accordingly, we are not able to state the exact time 
that power was restored to each individual customer on a 
particular circuit. 
Sincerely, 
Wes Holmes 
M ryl^ 
